

# **Supplementary Appendix**

## Re-evaluating the Role of Ideology in Chile

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# 1 Appendix A: Selection of Cerrillos

Table [A1](#) allows us to visually examine how Cerrillos is an excellent predictor of national electoral results. The first column provides the year of the presidential election, the second column the initials of the presidential candidate, the third the vote share of that candidate across the entire country, and the fourth the vote share of that candidate only in Cerrillos. The TAD (total absolute difference) will correspond to the sum of the difference between column 3 and column 4. The TAD for Cerrillos is reported in the first row of table [A2](#).

Table A1: Comparison between Chile and Cerrillos

Election	Candidate	Chile Vote Share	Cerrillos Vote Share
1989	EFR	0.551	0.573
1989	EBB	0.294	0.280
1989	FET	0.154	0.146
1993	EFR	0.579	0.579
1993	AAB	0.244	0.224
1993	JPE	0.061	0.071
1993	MMN	0.055	0.068
1993	EPP	0.046	0.047
1993	CRC	0.011	0.008
1999	RLE	0.479	0.495
1999	JLI	0.475	0.459
1999	GMM	0.031	0.034
1999	THG	0.005	0.004
1999	SLR	0.004	0.003
1999	AFB	0.003	0.002
2005	MBJ	0.459	0.465
2005	SPE	0.254	0.263
2005	JLI	0.232	0.212
2005	THG	0.054	0.058
2009	SPE	0.440	0.433
2009	EFR	0.296	0.262
2009	MEG	0.201	0.237
2009	JAM	0.062	0.066
2013	MBJ	0.467	0.464
2013	EMF	0.250	0.241
2013	MEG	0.109	0.142
2013	FPF	0.101	0.087
2013	MCR	0.028	0.027
2013	ASY	0.023	0.017
2013	RMM	0.012	0.012
2013	RIZ	0.005	0.005
2013	TJL	0.001	0.001

## 2 Appendix B: Selection of Recoleta and Independencia

As a way to increase the sample size, I include two other municipalities in the study. In this case, I selected the second and third municipalities in the Santiago province that best predict the national electoral results.<sup>1</sup> Table A2 provides the total absolute difference (TAD) for all the municipalities in the Santiago province. Recoleta and Independencia are the second and third best predictors.

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<sup>1</sup> Due to budget constraints, I restricted the geographic location of the second and third best predictors in the Santiago province since the new municipalities needed to be located close to Cerrillos, so the same enumerators could easily implement the survey.

Table A2: Total absolute differences (TAD) for counties in the Santiago province

County	Total absolute difference
Cerrillos	0.32
Recoleta	0.44
Independencia	0.45
El Bosque	0.46
Quinta Normal	0.48
La Cisterna	0.50
Macul	0.52
San Miguel	0.53
La Florida	0.57
Maipú	0.60
Estación Central	0.61
Conchalí	0.64
Quilicura	0.71
Peñalolen	0.77
Santiago	0.83
Renca	0.94
Pudahuel	0.94
San Joaquín	0.95
La Granja	0.95
Huechuraba	0.97
Lo Prado	0.98
Nuñoa	1.09
San Ramón	1.10
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	1.26
Lo Espejo	1.28
Cerro Navia	1.28
La Pintana	1.44
La Reina	1.55
Providencia	2.59
Lo Barnechea	3.13
Las Condes	3.63
Vitacura	4.45

### **3 Appendix C: Survey design**

The survey was implemented in August 2017, three months before the presidential elections. The sampling strategy had two different stages. In the first, I selected three municipalities that are good predictors of national electoral results. In the second, four enumerators used a random walk to select respondents in three municipalities. They were given a starting point and then had to invite participants in every third household until covering the entire assigned area. Enumerators had to report their locations at the beginning and end of each workday using smartphones with GPS. The survey was implemented under Columbia University IRB Protocol IRB-AAAR5187.

Regarding the conjoint experiment, the candidate profiles were generated in advance of the implementation using R. Each questionnaire had five pairs of candidates attached at the end. Profiles were presented side-by-side in an illustrative manner, and after selecting one candidate, participants were able to observe the next pair of candidates. The survey and conjoint were implemented on paper.

Enumerators presented the conjoint experiment reading this paragraph: "This final section attempts to understand your political preferences. We will show you profiles of hypothetical presidential candidates (non-real). You should tell us who you prefer for president. Each candidate has three attributes: ideology, profession, and age. We will repeat this exercise 5 times." After evaluating the pair, participants had to answer the following question: "Who would you vote for for president?"

The values are, in the case of ideology, "left" and "right;" for profession, "gardener," "teacher," "engineer;" and for age, "30," "40," and "50." Vignettes were not read to participants.

The survey also contains a framing experiment before the conjoint where respondents had to imagine possible negative scenarios (e.g., being affected by a natural disaster). The pure control condition of the framing experiment did not mention any hypothetical scenario. As a consequence, I only focus on the control group of that framing experiment to avoid any possible contamination.

## 4 Appendix D: Comparison with CEP survey

I use the CEP survey implemented in July–August 2017 as a benchmark. Table A3 summarizes the results for age, gender, education, electoral participation, and political preferences. The results shows that the sample used in this study is very similar to the nationally representative CEP survey conducted in August 2017.

The larger difference corresponds to education (0.64 vs 0.70 for high school education or more). This is, however, part of the research design: the sample of this study aims to have a larger proportion of less educated voters, who, based on the literature, we would expect to be less ideological.

Table A3: Comparison between samples

Variable	Survey	CEP
18-24 years old	0.09	0.08
25-34 years old	0.13	0.14
35-44 years old	0.21	0.17
45-54 years old	0.14	0.17
55 or older	0.44	0.43
Female	0.60	0.60
High school or less	0.64	0.70
Vote next election	0.62	0.59
Vote past election	0.64	0.65
Pinera vote share	0.28	0.32
Guiller vote share	0.17	0.17
Sanchez vote share	0.12	0.12



## 5 Appendix E: Ideological voters

The sample from this study contains a smaller number of non-ideological voters in comparison with the nationally representative survey implemented by the CEP in July-August 2017 (CEP, 2017). Table A4 compares the proportion of respondents who did not place themselves on the ideological spectrum in four different samples: first, the entire CEP survey; second, a subset of urban respondents from the metropolitan region in the CEP; third, a subset of respondents who live in the municipalities used in this study (only two of the three municipalities had respondents in the CEP); and fourth, the sample used in this study.

Table A4: Non-ideological voters

Sample	Proportion
Entire CEP sample	0.32
CEP Urban and Metropolitan	0.27
CEP Cerrillos and Independencia	0.18
Cerrillos, Recoleta, and Independencia	0.13

The results show that people from the urban metropolitan area, and specifically from Cerrillos, Recoleta, and Independencia, seem to be more ideological than the average Chilean voter. However, since this study is based on analyzing the data for each of the four subgroups of voters (left, right, center, and non-ideological), I would not expect this to be biasing the main results.

## 6 Appendix F: Alternative coding for ideology

As a robustness check, I used the coding strategy used by [Zechmeister \(2015\)](#) to identify left, right, and centrist voters. She coded those who respond 1, 2, or 3 as “left;” those who respond 4, 5, 6, or 7 as “center;” and those who respond 8, 9, or 10 as “right.” Figure A1 summarizes the results when using her coding strategy. The findings are the same regardless of the coding strategy used for left, right, and centrist voters.




Figure A1: Effects of candidates' attributes on probability of being voted for president

## 7 Appendix G: Regression tables

Table A5: Left-wing respondents

	Outcome
	Electoral Choice
Left-wing	0.493*** (0.037)
Professor	0.248*** (0.046)
Engineer	0.203*** (0.050)
40 years old	0.043 (0.045)
50 years old	0.057 (0.044)
Constant	-0.012 (0.038)
Observations	650

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A6: Right-wing respondents

	Outcome
	Electoral Choice
Left-wing	-0.391*** (0.048)
Professor	0.255*** (0.054)
Engineer	0.229*** (0.063)
40 years old	0.105* (0.056)
50 years old	0.179*** (0.052)
Constant	0.381*** (0.050)
Observations	434

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A7: Centrist respondents

	Outcome
	Electoral Choice
Left-wing	0.009 (0.035)
Professor	0.329*** (0.036)
Engineer	0.231*** (0.041)
40 years old	0.090** (0.036)
50 years old	0.126*** (0.038)
Constant	0.202*** (0.036)
Observations	1330

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A8: Non-ideological respondents

	Outcome
	Electoral Choice
Left-wing	0.062 (0.060)
Professor	0.374*** (0.077)
Engineer	0.170 (0.104)
40 years old	0.298*** (0.080)
50 years old	0.254*** (0.082)
Constant	0.065 (0.078)
Observations	250

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 8 Appendix H: Carryover effects

Table [A9](#) reports a test for carryover effects, which evaluates whether the attributes' effects are conditional on the pair they are been evaluated (the conjoint has five pairs of candidates per respondent). In other words, I want to check whether a particular attribute has the same importance for respondents regardless of which pair it is evaluated in. I regressed the outcomes on the attributes, indicators of the number of the pair, and an interaction between these variables. I find no evidence of carryover effects. The table only reports the interaction terms.

Table A9: Carryover effects

	Outcome
	Electoral Choice
Left*Pair2	0.035 (0.082)
Left*Pair3	0.014 (0.083)
Left*Pair4	-0.086 (0.082)
Left*Pair5	0.045 (0.084)
Professor*Pair2	-0.040 (0.100)
Engineer*Pair2	-0.009 (0.092)
Professor*Pair3	-0.008 (0.099)
Engineer*Pair3	-0.052 (0.091)
Professor*Pair4	-0.114 (0.101)
Engineer*Pair4	-0.088 (0.098)
Professor*Pair5	0.060 (0.103)
Engineer*Pair5	-0.070 (0.094)
40*Pair2	0.060 (0.098)
50*Pair2	0.106 (0.097)
40*Pair3	-0.052 (0.097)
50*Pair3	0.045 (0.094)
40*Pair4	0.065 (0.108)
50*Pair4	0.144 (0.095)
40*Pair5	0.020 (0.106)
50*Pair5	0.135 (0.097)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## 9 Appendix I: Balance check

Table A9 reports a multivariate balance check where I regress a binary indicator of reporting an ideology on indicator variables for all profile attributes. I find no evidence of imbalances, the randomized attributes do not predict if respondents provide or not an ideology.

Table A10: Balance check

	Outcome
	Electoral Choice
Left	−0.009 (0.012)
Teacher	0.002 (0.017)
Engineer	0.011 (0.015)
40	0.014 (0.013)
50	−0.001 (0.013)

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## References

- CEP. 2017. Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N° 80. Technical Report Julio-Agosto 2017  
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- Zechmeister, Elizabeth. 2015. Left-Right Identifications and the Latin American Voter. In *The Latin American Voter*. The University of Michigan Press.